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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
LOUISE OLSEN,
Pla~1ntiff

and Respondent,

-vs.PREFERRED RISK MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, an Iowa Corporation,
Defendant .and Appellant.

ADMISSION OF FACTS
The respondent agrees with the facts as stated by
the appellant except in the following particulars: The
following are facts established by the evidence.
STATEMEN·T OF FACTS
A. The plaintiff had driven her car to the west sid8
of the street and out of the lanes of moving traffic at a
place which would not impede any of the lanes of traffic
in order to change her flat tire. (TR. 10, TR. 59) Officer
Burkdoll, who came immediately after the accident and
saw the actual location of her automobile was asked the
following question:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"Q. 'Are you able to tell the jury, Officer Burkdoll,
what the location of the Chevrolet automobile
was, in regards to the moving lanes of traffic
on the west half of Washington Boulevard~
A.

It would not impede the moving lanes of
traffic." ( TR. 61)

Mr. Nuxoll had driven out of the eating place a few
feet away from where plaintiff had stopped. He had
stopped his car four to five feet to the rear of her car
and honked; she walked back and briefly told Mr. Nuxoll
that she had a flat tire. She then walked to the rear of
her car, opened the trunk lid and bent over to remove the
tools from the trunk. There was nothing to obstruct his
view. She was clearly in sight and in front of his automobile. Mr. Nuxoll then drove his car forward into plaintiff, pinning her between the two cars. J\{r. Nuxoll then
backed up and drove forward again; striking her for the
second time, then he backed up, drove out around her
vehicle and away. (TR. 11 & 12)
STATE1IENT OF POINTS
POINT ONE
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN DIRECTING A VERDICT ON THE QUESTION OF LIABILITY.
POINT TWO
SINCE COUNHEL'S ARGUMENT TO THE JURY IS
SUGGESTION AND NOT TESTIMONY, NO PREJUDI·CIAL
ERROR RESULTED IN ALLOWING ·COUNSEL TO MAKE A
MATHEMATICAL COMPUTATION OF GENERAL DAMAGES
FOR PAIN AND SUFFERING.
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POINT THREE
SINCE THE MATTER OF COUNSEL'S ARGUMENT IS
DISCRETIONARY WITH THE TRIAL COURT AND THAIT
DISCRETION WAS NOT ABUSED IN THIS .CASE, NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR RESULTED IN PERMI'TTING COUNSEL
TO MOTIVATE THE JUROR'S REASONING PROCESSES BY
ASKING WHAT THEY WOULD TAKE.

ARGlTMENT
POINT ONE
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN DIRECTING A VERDICT ON THE QUESTION OF LIABILITY.

The Supreme Court has long held that notwithstanding a question of contributory negligence is ordinarily
one of fact, where undisputed facts lead reasonable minds
to one conclusion, the Court must declare such conclusion
as a matter of law. (See Maybee v. M,aybee, 11 Pac. 2d,
973; Balle v. 81nith, 17 Pac. 2d 233.)
May it be noted further that when the plaintiff went
back to the Nuxoll automobile she was not there long.
She only had a few seconds to see Nuxoll. She was there
just long enough to tell him that she had a flat tire and
that ~was the reason she was not moving, and then
went back. She did not have a chance to see his actions.
He stayed in the car while she notified him the reason
she was stopped was because she had a flat tire. There
\Hls not any extended conversation. She proceeded directly to open her trunk lid with her back to Mr. Nuxoll and
leaned in for the tools. It was light with perfect visibility
3
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for Nuxoll. He knew that she was there. Now the thing
of particular significance is that at this time, even if the
plaintiff were negligent, which the respondent certainly
does not feel she was; yet assuming that she was -that
this moment when the plaintiff is directly in front of Mr.
Nuxoll's car standing in clear view of him, not facing
him and leaning against her trunk, Mr. Nuxoll now entirely controlled the situation. He knew where she was,
he knew that if he drove forward he would strike her.
His actions now entirely would determine whether there
was an injury. Yet in spite of this, Mr. Nuxoll drove directly into the plaintiff, backed off, and drove into her
again. No reasonable mind could say that the sole proximate cause of the injury was not the negligence of Mr.
Nuxoll. The Court was entirely correct in determining
that no reasonable mind could feel that the plaintiff was
guilty of negligence which was a proximate cause of the
injury. (See the following cases:)
Cederloff v. Whited, 169 Pac. 2d 777;
HaJrt v. Kerr, 175 Pac. 2d 475;
Toomers Estate v. U.P.R.R._, 239 Pac. 2d 163;
Peterson v. N-ielsen, 343 Pac. 2d 731;
McMurdiB v. Underwood, 346 Pac. 2d 711;
Gvrdner v. Union Oil Company, 13 Pac. 2d 915;
Crornpton v. Ogden ['nioll Rai-lroad Co., 235 Pac.
2d 515;
Cox v. Thompson, 254 Pac. 2d 1047;
Paulos v. Market St·reet, 28 Pac. 2d 94;
65 Corpus Ju,ris Secundum, pages 7±2, 743, 744;
J( nuts on v. Oregon Short Line, 2 Pac. 2nd 102.
4
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POINT TWO
SINCE COUNSEL'S ARGUMENT TO THE JURY IS
SUGGESTION AND NOT TESTIMONY, NO PREJUDI.CIAL
ERROR RESULTED IN ALLOWING ·COUNSEL TO MAKE A
MATHEMATICAL COMPUTATION OF GENERAL DAMAGES
FOR PAIN AND SUFFERING.

Counsel must be of as much aid to the jury as possible
in assisting them in reaching their verdict. To ask a jury
to proceed up a "blind alley in the dark" simply is not
reasonable. The reasons that have been given approving
the type of argument used in the instant case are:
(1) It is necessary that the jury be guided
by reasonable and practical considerations.
(2) That the trier of the facts should not be
required to determine the matter in the abstract
and relegated to a blind guess.
(3) The argument that the evidence fails to
provide a foundation for per diem suggestion is
unconvincing because the jury must, by that or
some other reasoning process, estimate and allow
an amount appropriately tailored to the particular
evidence in the case as to pain and suffering or
other such element of damages.
(4) That per diem suggestion of counsel
does no more than present one method of reasoning which the trier of the fact may employ to aid
him in making a reasonable and sane estimate.
(5) That per diem arguments are not evidence but are used only as illustration and suggestion.

5
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( 6) The claimed danger of such suggestion
being mistaken for evidence is an exaggeration
a_,nd if danger is present it canbe dispelled by the
. c.Qurt's chftrge.
· (7) Opposing counsel is equally free to suggest his own amounts.
·
'These are the reasons· given by the ·court in Ratner
v.· Arrington) (Dist. C of App. Florida, April9, 1959) 111
So. ( 2) 82 after a skillful and competent analysis of the
problem. _This decision is one of the most recent opinions
on this problem .. The comment on this decision by the
Editor-in-chief at 23 N acca Law Journal 257 is worth
repeating here :
"Chief Judge Carroll's analysis of the crucial
issue, presently clamoring for resolution in many
states, whether a trial judge has discretion to
permit counsel with the aid of a chart or blackboard to suggest in summation to the jury a per
diem or other mathematical formula for measuring damages for pain and suffering, is customarily
meticulous, straightforward, just and lucid. Chief
.Judge Carrol's cogently "Titten extremely convincing opinion is unreservedly recommended. to
the personal injury bar as an extraordinarily skilful abridgement of the best arguments which have
been advanced on· both sides of the question of the
propriety ·of a per diem ·formula for damages.
The result i,s -an opinion law-yers will want to read,
notjp.st respect. His patient and perceptive critique of the utility of the mathematical formula in
. assessing damages for 'pain and suffering is a
timely and telling corrective to the stultification
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of the flawed opposite holding in Botta v. Brunner
which, by banning such per diem measurement and
barring counsel from even comment upon the
amount prayed for in the ad damnum clause went
far to leave the jury wrapped in a Grand Banks
fog."
"Argument to jury which constitutes an example in arithmetic to show jury how to compute
damages has been held proper.'' 88 C.J.S. 378.
Trial judges in the Federal system, sitting as triers
of the fact, have been sustained in approaching the problem in this manner. In Imperial OilJ LimttYed (U.S. Ct.
App. 6th Cir. June 5, 1956) 234 F (2) 4, the court sustained a trial judges findings (sitting without a jury) in
using the following approach: by the use of a mathematical formula, involving a sliding scale of varient
amounts per day and month, geared to gradations of
pain. The circuit court observed that although novel, this
was not an arbitrary or unreasonable approach to the
problem presented and its application was so adjusted
as to be consistent with the evidence and to reach a result
which does not appear to us to be manifestly unjust.
Several courts have met this problem since the decision in Botta v. Brunner and have rejected the conclusion reached in the Botta case. Per diem assessment of
damages for pain and suffering makes more sense that
the "by guess and by golly" method. Contt'nental Bus
System} Inc. v. Toombs (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) 325 S.W.
7
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(2) 153; Ratner v. Arrington (D.C. App. Florida 1959)

111 S.o. (2) 82; Johnsonv·. Brown· (Nev. 1959) 345 P. (2)
75~
'
There is no error in. permitting counsel to use a chart
in his final argument to the jury. Miller Petroleum
Transporters, Ltd~ v. Price (Miss 1959) 114 So. (2) 756.
Several recent _cases approve with varying degrees
of enthusiasm counsel's right, in arguing the issue of the
amount of the damages to suggest the use of a per diem
or other mathematical formula as an aid to an accurate
estimate of the award for pain and suffering. Boutang ,
v. Twin City Motor: Bus Co. (1956 ~finn.) 80 NW (2)
30; Flahetty v. Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. (1958
Minn.) 87 NW (2) 633; Four County Electric Power
Asso. v. Clardy, (1954 Miss.) 73 So (2) 144, 44 ALR (2)
1191; Arnold v. El[J'-s (1957 :Miss.) 97 So. (2) 744; J.D.
TVright & Son Truck Line v. Chandler, (Tex. Civ. App.)
231 SW (2) 786; Ratner v. Arrington (D.C. App~ Florida
1959) 111 So. ( 2) 82 ; and the recent western case of
Johnson v. Brown (Nev.1959) 345 P (2) 754.
Counsel's final statement on the subject removed any
doubt that his statements were anything but suggestions:
"I'm just asking you to consider what would
be a r~as_onable .amount per day for what she's
gone through. * * * Now if that's ridiculous then
you set it up by any other n1eans that you know."
(Tr.128)
Counsel's arg~ment in the instant case does no more
than present one method of reasoning to the jury and
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the jury is free to use the n1ethod it wishes. The Suprenle Court of Nevada on October 29, 1959 has wholly
rejected the Botta case. The decision in Johnson vs.
Brown (Nev. 1959) 345 P(2) 754 is persuasive because
of the similar practice in that state and our state
of advising the jury of the amount of the prayer and
instructing the jury that their verdict may not exceed
that amount. In that case counsel for plaintiff suggested lOc per minute or $144.00 (as defense counsel
dvd in the case at bar) and the court observed at 345
P(2) 759:
''We feel therefore that the preferable rule in
this state in view of our statute and the custom
and practice prevalent thereunder is that whether,
under the circumstances of the particular case,
the arguments of counsel suggesting a mathematical basis for fixing damages for pain and suffering is an improper invasion of the rights of the
jury is to be determined by the trial judge in
the exercise of judicial discretion."

It should be noted that defense counsel used the "per
diem" and "per minute" argument in an effort to make
plaintiff's claims appear to be ridiculous.
POINT THREE
SINCE THE MATTER OF COUNSEL'S ARGUMENT IS
DISCRETIONARY WITH THE TRIAL COURT AND THA:T
DISCRETION WAS NOT ABUSED IN THIS ~CASE, NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR RESULTED IN PERMTTTING COUNSEL
TO MOTIVA'TE THE JUROR'S REASONING PROCESSES BY
ASKING WHAT THEY WOULD TAKE.
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The trial judge should be left large discretion in
permitting and restraining counsel's argument and his
rulings should generally be deferred to an appeal because
of his better position to know the meaning, construction
and effect of argument. 9 Blashfield 432.
The advocate should be allowed a wide latitude in
argument. This well established rule is well expressed
in the case of Tucker vs. Henniker, 41 N.H. 317.
"The counsel represents and is a substitute
for his client. The largest and most liberal freedom of speech is allowed and the law protects
him in it. His illustrations may be as various as
the resources of his genius; his argumentation
as full and profound as his learning can make it."
As stated at 88 C.J.S. 357-358:
"Counsel is allowed much latitude in arguing.
He may draw conclusions from the evidence on
his own system of reasoning, although such inferences as stated by counsel are inconclusive,
improbable, illogical, erroneous, or even absurd."
Lawyer vs. Stansell, 250 N.W. 887.
Hayes vs. Coleman, 61 N.W. (2) 634.
Seeley vs. Manhattan, 61 A. 585.
Guest vs. Guest, 235 S.W. (2) 710.
Seaboard Airline Ry. vs. Horning, 89 S.E. 493.
The latitude which fairly and properly was extended
to plaintiff's counsel in the present case was not an
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge.

10
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that no prejudicial error
O('('nrred in the court below and that the judgment of the
trial court should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
DALE T. BROWNING and
CALVIN GOULD
Attorneys for Respondent
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